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Abstract
Evidence from hypothetical scenarios strongly suggests the existence of a sunk cost bias, the
tendency to ‘throw good money after bad money.’ However, the few studies using incentives
are inconclusive. In addition, evidence on potential psychological channels underlying such a
bias is scarce. We present a laboratory experiment designed to investigate the sunk cost bias
and to test some prominent psychological mechanisms. Inspired by the hypothetical scenarios,
we use a two-stage investment task in which an initial investment needs to be made to start
a project. In the initial investment stage, the size of the investment and the responsibility of
the investor are exogenously varied. In the second investment stage, participants can either
decide to terminate the project or to make an additional investment to finish the project.
We do not find evidence for the sunk cost bias. To the contrary, we observe a robust reverse
sunk cost bias. That is, the larger the initial investment, the lower the likelihood to continue
investing in a project. Moreover, whether or not subjects are responsible for the initial
investment, does not affect their additional investment. More waste averse individuals also
do not react more strongly to sunk cost whereas being in the loss domain decreases additional
investment. Importantly, we replicate the sunk cost bias when using hypothetical scenarios.
Surprisingly, the reverse sunk cost bias also holds for those participants who exhibit a strong
sunk cost bias in the hypothetical scenarios.
Keywords: sunk cost bias, incentivized experiment, hypothetical scenario, cognitive dissonance,
loss aversion, waste aversion
JEL code: C91, D01, D90, D91
∗Marcello Negrini (corresponding author), Maastricht University, Department of Microeconomics and Public
Economics (MPE), P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, the Netherlands, m.negrini@maastrichtuniversity.nl;
Arno Riedl: CESifo, IZA, and Maastricht University, Department of Microeconomics and Public Economics
(MPE), P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, the Netherlands, a.riedl@maastrichtuniversity.nl; Matthias
Wibral, Maastricht University, Department of Microeconomics and Public Economics (MPE), P.O. Box 616, 6200
MD Maastricht, the Netherlands, m.wibral@maastrichtuniversity.nl. The authors thank the Maastricht Uni-
versity – Center for Neuroeconomics (MU-CEN) and the Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)
at Maastricht University, for financial support. Matthias Wibral gratefully acknowledges financial support from
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant
agreement 749741. We thank Andreas Schwaab and Edris Noori for research assistance and Shu Chen for program-
ming the task with z-Tree. We thank the members of the Prague Summer School on Behavioral Economics and
Psychology, the members of the MU-CEN and of the Human Decisions & Policy Design research theme (HDPD)
at Maastricht University, and seminar participants at the University of Bonn for their comments. We especially
thank Andrea Mannberg, Eveline Vandewal, Holger Gerhardt, Peter Werner, Riccardo Saulle and Jona Linde for
their insightful feedback, and Nickolas Gagnon for his extensive feedback on an earlier version of this manuscript.
This study was preregistered at OSF (https://osf.io/c253e).
1 Introduction
The sunk cost bias refers to the behavioral tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment
has been made, even if it is not optimal to do so (Arkes and Blumer, 1985). The bulk of the
evidence suggesting the existence of the sunk cost bias consists of responses to hypothetical survey
questions (e.g. Arkes and Ayton, 1999; Fox and Staw, 1979; Molden and Hui, 2011; Soman and
Cheema, 2001; Staw, 1976; Strough et al., 2008). For instance, in the seminal paper by Arkes
and Blumer (1985), participants are asked to imagine that they are the owners of a company
and have previously invested a large sum of money in what seemed to be a promising project.
When the project is almost finished, they learn that a competitor is about to release a better
product at a cheaper price. Respondents then need to consider whether to stop investing in the
development of their product and realize the loss or to persist with the project by making an
additional investment. Participants overwhelmingly state to carry out the additional investment
and are thus considered to fall prey to the sunk cost bias.
Examining the sunk cost bias is important because it has been implicated in a wide spectrum
of situations involving sunk costs in practice. For example, the sunk cost bias has been put
forward as an explanation for why politicians continue public works that went over budget (Ross
and Staw, 1993), why firms continue to invest in hopeless projects (Arkes and Blumer, 1985),
why people stay in failing relationships (Strube, 1988), or why researchers continue less promising
projects instead of starting new ones.
Interestingly, despite the intuitive appeal of the concept and the substantial body of evidence
from survey studies, it has been hard to demonstrate the sunk cost bias in incentivized studies,
both in the field and the lab (e.g. Friedman et al., 2007; Ashraf et al., 2010). Existing attempts
to study the sunk cost bias in the laboratory often have quite complicated designs and may be
prone to game form misconceptions (Cason and Plott, 2014), which might explain the incon-
sistent evidence. Therefore, it is important to have a workhorse for studying the bias that is
simple to understand and easily implementable, yet rich enough to allow learning more about the
psychological mechanisms underlying the sunk cost bias.
In this paper we present a novel design with incentivized choices to investigate the sunk
cost bias as well as important potential psychological mechanisms that could drive the bias.1
The experimental design is inspired by the classic project continuation example from the survey
literature. Specifically, we study a two-stage investment task in which an initial investment needs
1The study reported in the paper was preregistered at OSF (https://osf.io/c253e).
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to be made to start a project and to advance it to a second investment stage. In the second
investment stage, participants know the size of the initial investment size and can either decide
to terminate the project, or to carry out an additional investment to finish the project. If an
additional investment is made, the project is successful and yields a high payoff with some known
probability.
When participants make the decision about the initial investment, the exact cost of the
initial investment are unknown to them, but they do know the distribution of the potential
costs. Participants learn the exact costs of their initial investment only when they have to decide
whether to make the additional investment. The key idea here is that by varying the amount
initially invested (i.e., the sunk cost), we can study the impact of the size of the sunk cost on the
willingness to make the additional investment. A rational decision-maker should ignore the initial
investment and decide whether to make the additional investment based solely on the expected
utility of the available options. If we observe that participants are more willing to make the
additional investment after larger initial investments, this is evidence in favor of the sunk cost
bias.
Our design also includes features that allow us to test several psychological mechanisms that
have been proposed as drivers of the sunk cost bias. Specifically, we examine the roles of re-
sponsibility for the initial investment, of waste aversion, and of being in the loss domain when
making the additional investment decision. Concerning the role of responsibility, self-justification
and cognitive dissonance theory (e.g. Bazerman et al., 1984; Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1976) propose
that abandoning a project after an initial investment requires admitting that the initial invest-
ment was a bad decision. The sunk cost bias arises because continuing to pour resources into a
failing course of action is a way to justify one’s own past decisions. Personal responsibility for the
sunk cost should thus increase the willingness to invest additional resources for the continuation
of a project. To test this, we compare two types of situations, one in which participants are
responsible for the initial investment, and one in which they are not.
Another reason why the sunk cost bias may occur could be waste aversion. Arkes and Blumer
(1985) suggest that people are more willing to invest after bad news because not investing con-
stitutes an admission that the prior expenses were wasted. To investigate this, we include a
questionnaire measure of waste aversion (Haller and Schwabe, 2014). If waste aversion drives
the sunk cost bias, we would expect that more waste averse participants display a stronger sunk
cost bias independent of responsibility for the initial investment. In addition, the effect should
increase with the size of the sunk cost.
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Our exogenous variation of sunk cost at the individual level also allows us to test whether
the sunk cost bias depends on being in the loss domain. Prospect Theory suggests that the value
function is concave in the gain domain and convex in the loss domain, relatively to a reference
point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). According to this S-shaped value function, individuals are
risk seeking in the domain of losses and risk averse in the gain domain. Being in the loss domain
may thus lead to the sunk cost bias because further losses do not result in large decreases in
value; however, comparable gains do result in large increases in value.
There are two additional features of our design. First, it is simple and easy to understand.
As we discuss below, some of the previous work in experimental economics has used relatively
complicated designs which may have confused subjects (Weigel, 2018). Second, we also replicate
classic survey measures of the sunk cost bias from the psychology literature (Arkes and Blumer,
1985) in a post-experimental questionnaire. We can thus compare the results from our incentivized
task to classic survey measures within subject. This comparison can shed light on the discrepancy
of findings between surveys and incentivized studies.
Most of the evidence in favor of the sunk cost bias comes from hypothetical scenarios, whereas
the evidence from incentivized studies is mixed (for reviews, see, e.g., Sleesman et al., 2012;
Roth et al., 2015). To account for the inconsistent evidence, alternative explanations have been
suggested. For instance, responses in hypothetical vignette scenarios that have been interpreted
as a sunk cost bias may actually be due to the fact that participants do not fully adopt the
preferences described in the scenarios, but use their own homegrown preferences (Friedman et al.,
2007).2 In addition, as noted by Weigel (2018), subjects who are indifferent or confused might
exhibit choices that could be misinterpreted as the sunk cost bias.
Regarding field data, three recent papers report evidence that is consistent with a sunk cost
bias. Augenblick (2016) shows that data from penny auctions are in line with the predictions of
a theoretical model in which players’ value of winning the good increases with their previous bid
costs. Ratnadiwakara and Yerramilli (2017) find that past property taxes in California lead to
a significant increase of the sellers’ chosen listing price. Ho et al. (2018) exploit changes in the
price of a government license to buy a car in Singapore and find that an increase in sunk costs
(i.e., the price of the license) leads to an increase in driving.
2For example, a common scenario tells participants that they have accidentally booked vacations for the same
date at two different locations and now have to decide where to go. They are told to imagine that they spent more
money on location A, but that they actually prefer location B. Choosing location A is interpreted as evidence for
the sunk cost bias. However, if the participant actually prefers A over B and chooses A for this reason then the
response is not necesarily biased.
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Attempts to find the sunk cost bias in field experiments have been less successful. Arkes
and Blumer (1985) find that randomly providing discounts to buyers of theatre season tickets
decreases show attendance. However, this effect is only observed for the first half of the theatre
season and the sample is quite small. Ashraf et al. (2010) conducted field experiments testing the
impact of transaction price on the usage of a certain product. They report no evidence of a sunk
cost bias as households paying a higher transaction price are not more likely to use the product.
Ketel et al. (2016) test for a sunk cost bias in an educational setting. Students signing up for
extra-curricular tutorial sessions randomly received a discount on the tuition fee. The authors
find that on average the discount does not affect attendance or performance.
Overall, the picture emerging from field data and field experiments is thus quite mixed. One
potential reason is that it is hard to fully control for the possible confounds of selection, reputation,
and subjective beliefs (Weigel, 2018). Mcafee et al. (2010) also argue that conditioning behavior
on sunk costs could be rationalized, if agents react to sunk costs because of informational content,
reputation, or financial and time constraints.
There are only a few incentivized laboratory experiments investigating the sunk cost bias. To
our knowledge, the first attempt in economics is by Phillips et al. (1991). They study whether
identical lottery tickets are valued differently depending on the price (i.e., the sunk cost) at which
they were bought. Only a quarter of participants value the ticket more as the price increases and
thus exhibit a sunk cost bias, while another quarter of subjects show a reverse sunk cost bias, as
they value the ticket less with an increased price. In additional treatments with opportunities to
learn in a market environment, very few subjects exhibit a sunk cost bias. Heath (1995) studies
investments in a lottery where subjects can invest again in the same lottery when they have lost.
He finds a reverse sunk cost bias when the sum of incremental and sunk cost leads to an overall
loss. Offerman and Potters (2006) show that higher entry fees paid to gain the right to operate
in a market lead some players to set prices in a more collusive way.
The most comprehensive laboratory investigation of the sunk cost bias to date is Friedman
et al. (2007). The authors use a computer game where participants decide whether to keep
digging for a treasure on a virtual island or to incur a cost to move to another island. They only
find a very small sunk cost bias that is inconsistent across treatments with some treatments even
showing a reverse sunk cost bias. Our design is similar in spirit to two recent neuroeconomics
papers (Bogdanov et al., 2017; Haller and Schwabe, 2014). However, these papers use deception
in a way that makes their findings hard to interpret. In their setup, both a rational decision-
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maker and an individual prone to the sunk cost bias may exhibit the same behavior.3 Haita-Falah
(2017) studies a potential sunk cost bias in a setup in which the channels of loss aversion and
cognitive dissonance cannot drive the effect. She finds weak evidence for a sunk cost bias, which is
significant only for high sunk costs. Similar to Heath (1995), Weigel (2018) studies an individual
decision-making task inspired by penny auctions in which subjects endogenously accumulate
sunk cost. In contrast to Heath (1995), he reports that sunk costs increase the decision maker’s
willingness to continue along an unprofitable course of action. Finally, Ronayne et al. (2020) find
that 23% of participants in an MTurk study who have worked for a ticket for a certain lottery do
not switch to a ticket for a dominant lottery when offered to do so.
Our experiment differs from all previous studies in at least one of the following dimensions.
First, our design allows us to test the impact of different levels of sunk cost within subjects.
Second, it considers both situations where the participant is in the gain domain and situations
in which the participant is in the loss domain, relative to the initial endowment. Third, we use
exogenous variation to test the role of responsibility in a clean way at the individual level. We
have a larger sample per treatment and a simpler design than previous studies.4 Fourth, we are
also able to study the role of waste aversion. Finally, our design differs from previous experimental
studies (except Ashraf 2010 and Ketel et al., 2016) as it allows us to compare the tendency to
exhibit the sunk cost bias in both an incentivized and a hypothetical setting.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, in contrast to studies using hypothetical
questions and all other incentivized studies (except for Heath, 1995), and in contrast to our pre-
registered hypotheses, we do not observe a sunk cost bias but a reverse sunk cost bias. That
is, the larger the initial investment, the lower the likelihood of continuing to invest in a project.
This result also holds when we only consider those participants who display the sunk cost effect
in the hypothetical choice scenarios. Second, contrary to our hypothesis, we find no difference in
behavior depending on whether subjects are responsible for the initial investment or not. That is,
the reverse sunk cost bias is observed irrespective of whether or not participants are responsible for
the initial investment. Third, contrary to our expectation, we observe that participants are even
3Haller and Schwabe (2014) and Bogdanov et al. (2017) study a setup in which a risky investment project
is sometimes successful immediately after a first investment, and sometimes further investments are needed. A
higher willingness to make the second investment compared to the first one is taken as evidence for a sunk cost
bias. However, the true success probabilities and the stated ones differ in a way such that first investments have a
lower success probability. If subjects learn this over time, then they will be less likely to make the first investment
compared to the second one even if they do not exhibit a sunk cost bias.
4For example, Friedman et al. (2007) state: “it took us several tries over a period of months to get it [the
equilibrium strategy in their experiment] right.” In a replication attempt of Haita-Falah (2017) reported by Weigel
(2018), numerous subjects complained that they did not understand the instructions.
5
less willing to continue investing when they find themselves in the loss domain compared to the
gain domain. Fourth, we observe that higher self-reported waste aversion is positively correlated
with the willingness to make the additional investment. However, this effect is not larger for
higher higher levels of sunk cost. Finally, we replicate the findings from the hypothetical scenarios
of Arkes and Blumer (1985). Participants generally exhibit the sunk cost bias in hypothetical
scenarios, and especially when they imagine they were responsible for them. Our reverse sunk
cost bias in the incentivized settings thus does not seem to be due to an idiosyncratic sample.
We do not find support that the sunk cost bias in the hypothetical scenarios translates into a
sunk cost bias in the incentivized investment task. Even those participants who exhibit a strong
sunk cost bias in the hypothetical scenarios show a reverse sunk cost bias in the incentivized
investment task.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design.
Section 3 describes the pre-registered testable hypotheses. Section 4 shows the experimental
results. Finally, Section 5 discusses the results and limitations of the study and concludes.
2 Experimental design
The main part of the experiment consisted of a repeated choice task comprising two investment
stages, which was followed by a questionnaire and an additional choice task. Instructions were
given prior to the start of each respective part. The questionnaire included questions on sociode-
mographic characteristics, waste aversion, and hypothetical scenarios (adapted from Arkes and
Blumer, 1985) to elicit the sunk cost bias. After the questionnaire, participants played a lottery
choice task developed by Gächter et al. (2007) to measure individual loss aversion. The complete
set of instructions used in the experiment (including screenshots) are provided in Appendix G.
2.1 Investment task
The investment task is framed as investing in a project and is inspired by project continuation
scenarios used in some of the questionnaire studies reporting a sunk cost bias. It consists of two
investment stages: an initial investment stage and a continuation stage. Figure 1 provides an
overview of the setup of the investment task. In total, each participant makes decisions in 36
investment tasks, which are evenly split into so-called Responsibility projects and No Responsi-
bility projects. These projects are presented in random order and participants do not receive any
6
Initial Investment stage
10
Doanotainvest Invest
Continuation stage
10− C initial + 8
Doanotainvest Invest
10− C initial − Cadditional + 16aaa
p
aaa10− C initial − Cadditional + 8
1− p
Participants know:
a - Cinitial ∈ {0, 4, 8, 12, 14} and probability of occurrence (59 ; 19 ; 19 ; 19 ; 19)
a - Probability of success p ∈ {0.4, 0.6} and probability of occurrence (12 ; 12)
a - Cadditional = 4
a - Potential payoffs
Participants learn:
a - Realization of Cinitial
a - Realization of probability of success p
Figure 1. Decision tree of an investment task (Responsibility project)
feedback regarding the success of the project during the task. In the following, we describe the
set-up of a Responsibility project as depicted in Figure 1.
Responsibility projects. In the initial investment stage, participants receive an endowment of
e10 and decide whether to start a project of which they know that it has a positive expected
value.5 Participants know the distribution of the potential costs Cinitial of the initial investment,
but the realization of the costs is ex-ante unknown to them. Cinitial is e0 in 10 out of the 18
projects (No Initial Costs Projects), and e4, e8, e12 and e14, respectively, in two out of the 18
projects (Initial Costs Projects).6 At this stage participants also know that if they start a project
they will move on to the continuation stage where they can decide to continue the project or not.
They are also informed that the investment cost to continue the project will be Cadditional = e4
and that there are two success probabilities, p = 0.4 or p = 0.6, which each will occur with 50%
chance. In addition, participants know all potential outcomes and, thus, earnings.
In the initial investment stage, those participants who decide not to make the initial invest-
ment earn the initial endowment of e10 and move to the initial investment stage of the next
5Participants know the decision tree and thus can calculate the expected value of an initial investment and
later also of the additional investment.
6Participants did not know the exact number of decision situations for each level of sunk cost. They were
informed that: “If you make the initial investment, there will be an investment cost associated to your decision.
You will know the actual investment cost only after you have made the initial investment. On average, you can
expect the initial investment cost to be: e0 five out of nine times; e4 one out of nine times; e8 one out of nine
times; e12 one out of nine times; e14 one out of nine times”.
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investment task. Those who decide to make the initial investment learn about the realization of
the associated Cinitial and move to the continuation stage. In the continuation stage, they are
reminded of the initial investment costs Cinitial that are payed already and that the additional
investment is associated with a known cost Cadditional = e4. They also learn about the actual
success probability of the project.7 Participants also know all potential earnings associated with
their decisions. Given this information, participants have to decide whether to continue the
project by making an additional investment, or to abandon it.
The different payoffs associated with different courses of action in the continuation stage are
as follows. Participants receive e8 if they decide not to make the additional investment. Thus, a
participant who makes the initial investment, but then abandons the project in the continuation
stage earns e10− Cinitial + e8 = e18− Cinitial. If participants make the additional investment
and the project is unsuccessful, the investment returns e8. In case the project is successful,
the investment returns e16. Thus, a participant who makes the additional investment in the
continuation stage earns e10− Cinitial −e4 +e8 = e14− Cinitial if the project is unsuccessful,
and e10− Cinitial − e4 + e16 = e22− Cinitial if the project is successful.
No Responsibility projects. In the No Responsibility projects, participants are also initially
endowed with e10, but here the computer makes the initial investment on their behalf. Thus, in
this type of projects, participants are not responsible for the initial investment and the associated
sunk cost. After the initial investment is made, participants are presented with the continuation
stage, which is identical in both the Responsibility and the No Responsibility projects.
We did not use the labels Responsibility and No Responsibility in the experiment. Participants
were informed that in some cases they could decide to make the initial investment or not, and in
other cases the computer would make the initial investment on their behalf. In the experiment, we
implemented the decision screen such that at the beginning of the initial investment stage in the
Responsibility projects participants were reminded of the distribution of Cinitial and were given the
opportunity to make the initial investment or not. In the No Responsibility projects, participants
were again reminded about the distribution of Cinitial, and informed that the computer made the
decision on their behalf. The decision screens can be found in Appendix G.
Several considerations guided our choice of parameter values. First, as we are interested
in the behavior in the continuation stage, we chose the parameters such that making the initial
investment is attractive in expectation for moderately risk averse participants. The expected value
7In fact, each success probability occurs in half of the investment tasks in a random order across decision
situations for each individual.
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of making the initial investment is e14.18 and thus substantially higher than the endowment of
e10. Ex-ante only someone with very strong risk aversion should not make the initial investment.8
We chose the distribution of Cinitial (i.e., the sunk cost) such that the probability of Cinitial = 0
is above 50% with the goal to make the initial investment decision attractive, while at the same
time still having a fairly equal number of observations with Cinitial > 0.
Second, we chose the different levels of the sunk cost such that for half of the decision situations
in which there is a strictly positive sunk cost, abandoning the project in the continuation stage
does not lead to a loss compared to the endowment. For Cinitial of e4, participants who decide to
abandon the project in the continuation stage receive a payoff of e14 and are better off than if they
had not made the initial investment and received their endowment of e10. For a Cinitial of e8,
they break exactly even. For the other two levels of Cinitial (e12 and e14), participants make a
loss compared to their endowment if they decide to abandon the project. These values were chosen
such that assuming a reference point of e10, given the median estimated curvature parameters,
loss aversion coefficient, and probability weighting values from Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
Cumulative Prospect Theory would predict the following: a participant will make the additional
investment with success probability p ≥ 0.4 only for Cinitial ≥ e12.9 Third, we chose to have
two different success probabilities in the continuation stage to minimize possible floor and ceiling
effects, thus having a greater chance of finding a sunk cost bias.
2.2 Psychological measures related to the sunk cost bias
Waste aversion has been proposed as an explanation for the sunk cost bias (Arkes and Blumer,
1985). To explore this mechanism, we ask participants fill out a short questionnaire (Haller and
Schwabe, 2014) that aims to assess their desire not to waste resources after the investment task.
This questionnaire consists of four statements that are answered on a scale from 1 (“I do not
agree”) to 11 (“I completely agree): “It is important for me not to appear wasteful”, “Wasted
investments hurt me”, “People who know me think I am wasteful” (inversely coded), and “It
8For example, any decision maker with the CRRA utility function U(x) = 1
1−rx
1−r with an r < 2.05 will
always make the initial investment. For comparison, Holt and Laury (2002) do not observe any participant with
r > 1.37.
9 We apply Cumulative Prospect Theory as in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), where the prospect is the
product of decision weights π(p) and value of the potential outcome, as shown by: V (x) =
{
xα if x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)β if x < 0 .
We assume a reference point of e10 (i.e., the initial endowment) and the parameters as estimated in Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) of loss aversion λ = −2.25, curvature coefficients in the positive domain (α) and in the negative
domain (β) = 0.88, and a decision weight π(p) = ρ
γ
(ργ+(1−ρ)γ)
1
γ
with γ = 0.61 in the gain domain and γ = 0.69 in
the loss domain.
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annoys me if investments are not successful”. The scores for the 4 items are summed up and the
total score is taken as an indicator of the strength of the individual’s desire not to appear wasteful.
With our design, we can disentangle the role of waste aversion from cognitive dissonance as its
effect should be present both with and without responsibility for incurring sunk costs, whereas
cognitive dissonance should only affect behavior in the Responsibility projects.
To examine whether the survey measure of the sunk cost bias used in the literature correlates
with our incentivized measure, participants also answer four binary hypothetical questions related
to the sunk cost bias. These questions are slightly modified versions of four vignette studies in the
seminal paper by Arkes and Blumer (1985). To make them more relatable to our subject pool,
we changed the travel destinations and the monetary amounts used in the hypothetical scenarios.
The scenarios are reported in full in Appendix F. For two scenarios, participants were instructed
to imagine they were responsible for the initial investment, while for the other two scenarios they
were told someone else was responsible for it. From the answers, we construct an index ranging
from 0 to 4 indicating the strength of the tendency to show the sunk cost bias in hypothetical
scenarios.
2.3 Loss aversion
To measure loss aversion, we use a task by Gächter et al. (2007).10 In this task, participants
decide for each of six lotteries whether they want to accept it or reject it. Across lotteries, the
winning prize is fixed at e6 while the potential loss varies between e2 and e7, as shown in
Table D.1 in Appendix D.
Under Cumulative Prospect Theory, behavior in this task is jointly determined by probability
weighting, the curvatures of the utility function in the gain and loss domain, and loss aversion.
Under certain assumptions, in particular, linearity of the value function, the task provides a
simple measure of the loss aversion parameter in cumulative prospect theory.11 In the context of
the sunk cost bias, the linearity assumption can influence predictions substantially. For example,
10To keep the experiment within reasonable time limits, we decided against a full-blown estimation of the
parameters of a prospect theoretic utility function (e.g., Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009)
11Gächter et al. (2007) assume that a participant is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the lottery if
w
+
(0.5)v(G) = w−(0.5)λ v(L), where L denotes the loss in a given lottery and G the gain; v(x) is the utility of the
outcome x ∈ {G,L}, λ denotes the coefficient of loss aversion in the choice task; and w
+
(0.5) and w
−
(0.5) denote
the probability weights for the 0.50 chance of gaining G or losing L, respectively. Considering that w
+
(0.5) =
w
−
(0.5), only the ratio v(G)
v(L)
= λ defines an individual’s implied loss aversion in the lottery choice task. The
additional assumption that v(x) is linear (v(x) = x) for small amounts yields a very simple measure of loss
aversion: λ = G/L.
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a loss averse individual who does not weight probabilities and has a linear value function will not
display a sunk cost bias in our experiment. In fact, for a sufficiently high degree of loss aversion
(λ > 2), such an individual would be less likely to make the additional investment around their
reference point than when all outcomes lie either in the gain or in the loss domain. In contrast,
another individual with the median cumulative prospect theory parameter values estimated in
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) would show an identical choice pattern in our loss aversion task
as the previous individual, but display a sunk cost bias in the investment task.12
In keeping with the convention, we call the switching point between acceptance and rejection
of the lottery “Loss aversion”, but the reader should be aware that this switching point might
also reflect factors other than loss aversion such as probability weighting and curvature. We also
ran all analyses using the loss aversion λ coefficient as calculated by Gächter et al. (2007), i.e.,
assuming that the value function is linear, instead of the switching point between acceptance and
rejection lottery. All results are qualitatively robust to this alternative specification.
2.4 Procedure
We recruited 108 participants (42 men; mean age = 21.5 years, s.d. =2.5 years) using ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015). The experiment was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted
at the Behavioral and Experimental Economics Laboratory (BEELab) of Maastricht University.
Each participant completed the experiment in a randomly assigned cubicle isolated from other
participants. In total, we conducted five experimental sessions and each session lasted about
60 minutes. Each participant completed the incentivized investment task first, followed by the
psychological measures and finally by the loss aversion task. At the end of the experiment, one
randomly selected decision of the investment task and one randomly selected decision in the loss
aversion task counted for payment. Participants were informed that any losses in the loss aversion
task would be deducted from a flat fee of e7 they earned for answering the questionnaire and
the hypothetical questions reported in Section 2.2. During the investment task, participants did
not know that there would be other tasks or payments later in the experiment. Participants
earned e13.75 on average and all earnings were paid via bank transfers, a common procedure in
the Netherlands. Subjects were truthfully informed that the payments were issued by research
assistants unrelated to the experiment and subsequent data analysis, and that their anonymity
was thus assured.
12Such an individual would always make the additional investment for Cinitial ≥ 12, but not for Cinitial < 12,
assuming a reference point of 10, i.e., the initial endowment (see Footnote 9).
11
3 Hypotheses
The hypotheses were preregistered and can be found at (https://osf.io/c253e).13 Our main inter-
est lies in the additional investment decisions in the continuation stage. A rational decision-maker
should base her investment choice only on the costs and benefits that are expected to arise from
this choice. In our case, a rational decision-maker should base investment decisions only on the
expected utility of the investment project and ignore any sunk cost. However, if a decision-maker
is prone to the sunk cost bias, the decision to make the additional investment should be affected
by the existence as well as level of the initial investment cost, Cinitial. Accordingly, our null
hypothesis is that participants’ decisions in the continuation stage are independent of the in-
vestment costs incurred in the initial investment stage. Our alternative hypotheses relate to the
existence of a sunk cost bias.
Hypothesis 1. Sunk cost bias. (a) Participants are more likely to make the additional in-
vestment when Cinitial > e 0 than when Cinitial = e 0. (b) The higher Cinitial, the more likely it
is that the additional investment is made.
According to the cognitive dissonance account, we expect a stronger sunk cost bias for projects
where participants are responsible for the initial investment (Responsibility projects) than for
projects where the computer decides to make the initial investment on their behalf (No Respon-
sibility projects). The responsibility effect (Staw, 1976) states that when people are confronted
with negative feedback about the success of a decision, they commit more resources to this course
of action and persist with it for a longer time if they were responsible for making the initial deci-
sion than if someone else made this decision. Based on the findings of the psychological literature
(e.g., Staw, 1976; Bazerman et al., 1984; Kirby and Davis, 1998; Schoorman and Holahan, 1996;
Schulz and Cheng, 2002), we formulate our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Responsibility effect. (a) After an initial investment with Cinitial > e 0,
the likelihood of making the additional investment is larger in Responsibility projects than in No
Responsibility projects. (b) The increase in the likelihood of making the additional investment as
Cinitial increases is larger in Responsibility projects than in No Responsibility projects. (c) When
Cinitial = e 0, there is no difference in the likelihood of making the additional investment between
Responsibility projects and No Responsibility projects.
13Note that the hypotheses are the same as in the preregistration document, but their order and exact formu-
lation have been modified for reasons of clarity.
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Conditional on finding that participants exhibit a sunk cost bias, we formulate further hy-
potheses relating to potential mechanisms behind the sunk cost bias. If the desire not to waste
resources or not to appear wasteful drives the sunk cost effect (Arkes and Blumer, 1985), we
expect that waste aversion correlates with the sunk cost bias.
Hypothesis 3. Waste aversion. (a) The higher the initial investment cost, the more the
waste aversion score positively correlates with the likelihood of making the additional investment.
(b) Hypothesis 2(c) is confirmed and, after initial investment when Cinitial > e 0, there is no
difference in the likelihood of making an additional investment between Responsibility and No
Responsibility projects.
The sunk cost bias may emerge when participants fall behind their initial endowment of e10.
That is, when they are in the loss domain relative to this endowment. Recall that, for projects
with Cinitial of e12 and e14, participants who do not make an additional investment fall behind
the initial endowment for sure, because in that case they only earn e6 and e4, respectively. Thus,
based on Cumulative Prospect Theory (see Footnote 9) we formulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. Loss domain (a) The likelihood of making the additional investment when
Cinitial is e12 or e14 is higher than for lower non-zero initial investment costs. (b) This differ-
ence in the likelihood of making the additional investment is positively related to the loss aversion
score.
4 Results
In this section, we describe our findings in relation to the preregistered hypotheses. When a
hypothesis is rejected, we present additional exploratory analyses. First, we investigate whether
we find evidence of a sunk cost bias. Second, we describe the influence of responsibility for the
sunk costs on the willingness to continue to invest. Third, we investigate the impact of waste
aversion, and of being in the loss domain. Finally, we show whether the tendency to exhibit a
sunk cost in a hypothetical setting is correlated with the findings in the incentivized setting.
We present results using both non-parametric tests and regression analyses. All reported tests
are two-sided. In the regression analyses, we use logit models with standard errors clustered at the
participant level. The dependent variable is the decision to make the additional investment in the
continuation stage, coded as a binary variable taking on value 1 when the additional investment
was made and value 0 when it was not made. Depending on the hypotheses considered, the sunk
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costs are coded in three different ways: (1) as a dummy variable that takes on value 1 when the
initial investment cost is strictly positive (called Initial Cost > 0 ), (2) as a continuous variable
with the values of Cinitial (called Initial Cost), and (3) as a dummy variable that takes on value
1 if Cinitial is e12 or e14 (called Loss Domain).
In the presentation of regression results we focus on those specifications where control variables
are included, but also report the results without control variables for completeness. Control
variables comprise the probability of project success, the measure of loss aversion and waste
aversion, the score in the hypothetical sunk cost questionnaire, gender, whether the field of study
is economics, and the repetitions of trials in the task, unless otherwise specified.14 The coefficient
estimates of the control variable estimates are reported in Appendix A.
4.1 Is there evidence of a sunk cost bias?
According to the sunk cost hypothesis, we expected that participants should be more likely to
make the additional investment with Cinitial > e 0 (Hypothesis 1a). We also expected that the
higher Cinitial, the more likely a participant is to make the additional investment (Hypothe-
sis 1b). In contrast, however, we observe that participants are less willing to make the additional
investment when Cinitial > e 0 (61%) compared to when Cinitial = e 0 (79%). This difference in
the relative frequency of investment choices in the continuation stage is statistically significant
(N = 108, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001). This result is corroborated by the negative and
significant coefficient of the dummy variable Cinitial > e 0 in Model (1) of the regression analysis
in Table 1 (p < 0.001). Thus, our result shows a pattern opposite to the hypothesis, consistent
with a reverse sunk cost bias.
These results also indicate that, as Cinitial increases, participants are progressively less willing
to make the additional investment in the continuation stage. Figure 2 shows that every increase
in Cinitial is accompanied by a decrease in the willingness to make the additional investment.
This is supported by the negative and significant coefficient of the continuous variable Initial
Cost in Model (2) in Table 1 (p < 0.001).
Result 1. Reverse sunk cost bias. Participants’ willingness to make additional investments
decreases with Cinitial.
14To measure loss aversion, we use the switching point in the loss aversion task described in Section 2.3. We
code the variable such that a lower value implies lower loss aversion. Using the switching point in the loss aversion
task, we code the variable such that it ranges from −6 to 0, which corresponds to a λ coefficient ranging from 0.87
to 3.01, as estimated in Gächter et al. (2007).
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Table 1. The effect of initial investment on additional investment.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial Cost > 0 -1.380∗∗∗ -1.030∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.168)
Initial Cost -0.142∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.017)
Constant -6.288∗∗∗ -6.529∗∗∗ 1.564∗∗∗ 1.555∗∗∗
(0.879) (0.888) (0.161) (0.161)
Controls included Yes Yes No No
N 3619 3619 3691 3691
Note: Logit panel regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the participant level.
Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise. In
model (1) and (3), the initial costs are coded as a dummy variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of
1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise. In model (2) and (4), the initial costs are coded as a continuous
variable Initial Cost. Controls are present in Model (1) and (2) and include the measures of loss aversion,
waste aversion and the score in the hypothetical sunk cost questionnaire, in addition to probability of
success, gender, field of study economics and the repetitions of trials in the task. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 2. Average relative frequency of the additional investment for each Cinitial.
This figure includes both Responsibility and No Responsibility projects. The vertical bars show the 95% confidence
interval, using individual averages as the unit of observation.
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4.2 Does being responsible for the initial investment matter?
Existing studies that investigate the sunk cost bias using monetary incentives consider only
the situation where participants are responsible for the initial investment. According to the
responsibility effect, they are more likely to be prone to the sunk cost bias if they are responsible
for the initial investment than when someone else made this decision (Hypothesis 2).
In Responsibility projects, participants made the initial investment about 90% of the time.
For 99 out of the 108 participants (92%), we have at least one observation for each Cinitial. In the
No Responsibility projects the computer made the initial investment on behalf of the participants
in 100% of the time. Comparing the frequency of additional investments in Responsibility and
No Responsibility projects we find no difference. Specifically, when aggregating decisions over all
Cinitial > 0, participants are equally likely to make the additional investment in Responsibility
and No Responsibility projects. In both cases, the likelihood of making the additional investment
Table 2. The effect of responsibility on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial Cost > 0 -1.377∗∗∗ -1.028∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.178)
Initial Cost -0.142∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.018)
Responsibility 0.034 0.029 0.033 0.022
(0.106) (0.104) (0.084) (0.081)
Initial Cost > 0 × Responsibility -0.007 -0.003
(0.160) (0.118)
Initial Cost × Responsibility 0.001 0.002
(0.015) (0.011)
Constant -6.303∗∗∗ -6.541∗∗∗ 1.548∗∗∗ 1.545∗∗∗
(0.878) (0.883) (0.169) (0.167)
Controls included Yes Yes No No
N 3619 3619 3691 3691
Note: Logit panel regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the participant level.
Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise. In
model (1) and (3), the initial costs are coded as a dummy variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of
1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise. In model (2) and (4), the initial costs are coded as a continuous
variable Initial Cost. Controls are present in Model (1) and (2) and include the measures of loss aversion,
waste aversion and the score in the hypothetical sunk cost questionnaire, in addition to probability of
success, gender, field of study economics and the repetitions of trials in the task. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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was 60.5% (N = 107; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.546).15 This result is corroborated in
the regression analysis of Model (1) in Table 2 by the insignificant coefficient of the interaction
between Initial Cost > 0 and a dummy variable Responsibility which takes value 1 when the
participant is responsible for making the initial investment (p = 0.965). This indicates that,
when Cinitial > e0, there is no difference in the likelihood of making an additional investment
between Responsibility and No Responsibility projects. Hypothesis 2a is thus rejected.
We also hypothesized that with increasing Cinitial, the increase in the likelihood of making
the additional investment would be stronger in Responsibility than in No Responsibility projects
(Hypothesis 2b). Figure 3 shows how frequently the additional investment is made for each
Cinitial for Responsibility and No Responsibility projects, respectively, and suggests that there is
no difference between the two types of projects. This is corroborated in the regression analysis
reported in Table 2 by the insignificant coefficient of the interaction term between Initial Cost
and Responsibility (p = 0.941) in Model (2). As we do not find any difference in the likelihood
Figure 3. Average relative frequency to make the additional investment for each Cinitial, sepa-
rately for Responsibility and No Responsibility projects.
The vertical bars show the 95% confidence interval, using individual averages as the unit of observation.
15N = 107 (instead of 108) because one participant did not invest in any of the responsibility projects with
Cinitial > 0. We note that there is also no difference between Responsibility and No Responsibility projects if we
only include those No Responsibility projects for which a participant decided to enter in Responsibility projects
(N = 107; Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.518). The result also holds if we exclude those who did not make
an investment for all initial costs (N = 99; Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.5). The same holds if we conduct
the analysis separately for the two different success probabilities (p = 0.4: 38% in Responsibility and 40% in No
Responsibility ; p = 0.6: 83% in Responsibility and 81% in No Responsibility).
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of making the additional investment between Responsibility and No Responsibility as Cinitial
increases, we thus reject Hypothesis 2b.16
Finally, we hypothesized that participants would be equally likely to make the additional
investment in Responsibility and No Responsibility projects when Cinitial is zero (Hypothesis 2c).
A Wilcoxon signed-rank test supports this hypothesis (N = 108; p = 0.785), which is corroborated
by the insignificant coefficient of the variable Responsibility in Model (1) in Table 2 (p = 0.747).17
Result 2. Responsibility effect. Responsibility for the initial investment does not signifi-
cantly influence the likelihood of making the additional investment.
4.3 The effect of waste aversion and of being in the loss domain
Given that we do not find evidence for a sunk cost bias, Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 on the
role of waste aversion and of being in the loss domain, which were conditional on finding such an
effect, are not directly tested as preregistered. However, as we find evidence for a reverse sunk
cost bias, we present exploratory analyses in relation to this finding.
Model (1) in Table 3 tests whether higher Waste aversion, as measured by our questionnaire,
increases the likelihood to make the additional investment. The coefficient of Waste aversion is
positive and significant at p = 0.091. This suggests that participants who have a stronger self-
reported waste aversion are generally more likely to make the additional investment. However,
Model (2) in Table 3 shows that the interaction between Waste aversion and the dummy Initial
Cost > 0 is not significant and even has the wrong sign (p = 0.146). Thus, in contrast to the
idea that waste aversion is an explanation for the sunk cost bias, the influence of waste aversion
is not stronger for situations in which there is a “waste” in the form of sunk cost.
Result 3. Waste aversion. Waste aversion weakly increases the likelihood to make the addi-
tional investment. However, stronger waste aversion does not correlate positively with the will-
ingness to make the additional investment when sunk costs are present.
To analyze the role of being in the loss domain after an initial investment, we compare projects
with Cinitial of e12 and e14 with the other non-zero Cinitial of e4 and e8. In the higher initial
cost projects deciding not to make the additional investment implies to fall behind the initial
16In the linear probability model in Table B.3 in Appendix B the coefficient of responsibility is a quite precisely
estimated zero.
17All results regarding the additional investment discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 hold (1) when considering
only the participants who always make the initial investment in Responsibility projects and (2) when analyzing
only those who not always make the initial investment in Responsibility projects. These robustness checks are
reported in Appendix B.
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Table 3. The effect of waste aversion on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Waste aversion 0.040+ 0.081+ 0.040∗ 0.073∗
(0.024) (0.043) (0.018) (0.033)
Initial Cost > 0 0.700 0.700
(1.473) (1.107)
Initial Cost > 0 × Waste aversion -0.070 -0.058
(0.048) (0.037)
Constant -6.316∗∗∗ -7.377∗∗∗ -0.163 -0.629
(0.821) (1.287) (0.556) (0.970)
Controls included Yes Yes No No
N 3619 3619 3691 3691
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level.
Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise.
The initial costs are coded as a dummy variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs
are present, 0 otherwise. Controls are present in Model (1) and (2) and include the measures of loss
aversion and the score in the hypothetical sunk cost questionnaire, in addition to probability of success,
gender, field of study economics, and the repetitions of trials in the task. Results hold when controlling
also for responsibility of the initial investment. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
endowment of e10 and therefore to be in the loss domain, whereas this is not the case for the
lower initial cost projects. In Table 4, Cinitial is coded as a dummy variable (Loss Domain),
which takes value 1 if Cinitial is e12 or e14. Model (1) in Table 4 shows that the likelihood of
making the additional investment in the projects where Cinitial is e12 or e14 is lower than for
the other non-zero initial cost projects (p < 0.001), indicating that participants rather accept to
incur a certain loss relative to their initial endowment than making the additional investment.
That is, instead of gambling for recovery or at least trying to get closer to the initial reference
point, participants withdraw from further investments even more once they find themselves in
the loss domain.
The coefficient estimate of the variable Loss aversion is negative and significant (p < 0.001),
which indicates that those participants who are more loss averse are generally less willing to make
the additional investment. The interaction between Loss Domain and Loss aversion in Model (2),
is negative and significant at p = 0.056.18. This shows that the more loss averse a participant is,
the less likely he or she is to make the additional investment when Cinitial is e12 or e14. These
results also hold when using the loss aversion coefficient λ as calculated in Gächter et al. (2007).
18The distribution of the switching points and the implied loss aversion λ as calculated in Gächter et al. (2007)
are shown in Appendix D
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Table 4. The effect of being in the loss domain on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Loss domain -0.779∗∗∗ -1.514∗∗ -0.567∗∗∗ -1.057∗∗
(0.188) (0.475) (0.143) (0.359)
Loss aversion -0.315∗∗∗ -0.145 -0.234∗∗ -0.118
(0.095) (0.112) (0.074) (0.088)
Loss domain × Loss aversion -0.329+ -0.222+
(0.172) (0.131)
Constant -6.413∗∗∗ -6.098∗∗∗ 0.314 0.569∗
(1.044) (1.046) (0.210) (0.249)
Controls included Yes Yes No No
N 1612 1612 1612 1612
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the participant level.
Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise. The
initial costs are coded as a dummy variable Loss Domain that takes value 1 when initial costs are e12
or e14, 0 otherwise. Only cases where Cinitial > e0 are included. Controls are present in Model (1) and
(2) and include the measures of waste aversion and the score in the hypothetical sunk cost questionnaire,
in addition to probability of success, gender, field of study economics, and the repetitions of trials in the
task. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Result 4. Loss domain. Being in the loss domain decreases the likelihood of making the addi-
tional investment. Moreover, loss aversion decreases the likelihood to make the additional invest-
ment.
4.4 Sunk cost in hypothetical settings vs. incentivized settings
At the end of the experiment, our participants answered four hypothetical scenarios adapted
from Arkes and Blumer (1985). This allows us to first compare the answers of our participants
to those reported in the sunk cost literature and second to test whether participants’ reaction
to sunk cost is similar in our incentivized setting and the hypothetical scenarios. While the
normative predictions are clear and indicate that a rational agent should ignore sunk cost, we
observe that only 15 participants out of 108 (14%) answered accordingly and ignored the sunk
cost in all four hypothetical scenarios. The median participant answered two out of the four
scenarios consistent with the sunk cost bias, indicating a moderate tendency to be prone to the
sunk cost bias in hypothetical scenarios. This tendency is stronger for the two hypothetical
scenarios where participants are told to imagine they are responsible for having invested some
initial cost compared to the two scenarios where they were not responsible (N = 108; Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, p = 0.019).19
19See Appendix F for the distribution of sunk cost scores in the hypothetical scenarios.
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Thus, our results in the hypothetical scenarios are generally in line with the findings reported
in Arkes and Blumer (1985) and we replicate them using a larger sample size. In addition, in our
within-subject design in the hypothetical scenarios, we also find support for the responsibility
effect as participants show a stronger tendency to show a sunk cost bias in the scenarios where
they were told to imagine to be responsible for the sunk cost compared to when they were asked
to imagined not to be responsible.
However, the evidence of a sunk cost bias in hypothetical scenarios does not translate to
behavior in the incentivized investment task. Figure 4 plots the additional investment for each
initial cost and each score of the hypothetical sunk cost bias (measured from 0 to 4). It shows that
participants exhibit the reverse sunk cost bias in the incentivized investment task, irrespective of
the strength of the sunk cost bias in the hypothetical scenarios. Even the subset of participants
with a strong tendency to consider sunk cost in the hypothetical settings (3 or 4 out of 4 answers
in line with a sunk cost bias) shows the reverse sunk cost pattern in the incentivized task. Thus,
the tendency to take sunk costs into account measured by the hypothetical scenarios does not
translate to behavior in the incentivized investment task.
Figure 4. Additional investment by hypothetical sunk cost score.
Mean decision to make the additional investment, separately for each score in the hypothetical scenario. The
vertical bars show the 95% confidence interval, using individual averages as the unit of observation.
Result 5. Hypothetical and Revealed Sunk Cost Bias. We replicate the sunk cost bias
using hypothetical scenarios. However, even the subjects who exhibit a strong proneness to the
sunk cost bias in the hypothetical scenarios show the reverse sunk cost bias in the incentivized
setting.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
Using a novel experimental design, we study the sunk cost bias in an incentivized setting and
assess potential channels underlying such an effect. We find that participants do indeed react
to exogenous variations in sunk cost, but not in the direction predicted by the sunk cost bias.
Instead, our main finding is that participants are less likely to make an additional investment the
higher the sunk cost. Our data thus provide evidence for a reverse sunk cost bias.
The overall pattern of our behavioral findings regarding the effect of sunk cost can be ratio-
nalized in different ways. For example, a risk averse decision maker with a CRRA utility function
who thinks about the payoffs from the experiment in isolation (i.e., considers only the money
in the experiment in the utility function instead of her total wealth) would be increasingly less
likely to make the additional investment as sunk costs increase.
A loss averse decision maker with linear utility in the loss and gain domain could also display a
behavioral pattern resembling the one we observe. This would be the case if the decision maker’s
reference point is somewhat lower than the endowment of e10. Such a reference point may reflect
the amount a participant expects to (minimally) gain for the time spent on the investment task.
For instance, with a reference point of e7 making the additional investment becomes a mixed
gamble for initial costs of at least e8. Thus, a sufficiently loss averse decision maker would be
less likely to make the additional investment than when initial costs are e0 and e4.
Our findings are also reminiscent of ideas suggested in two previous papers in the psychology
literature. Heath (1995) argues that participants set a mental limit for their expenditures when
this is easily feasible. When an expenditure reaches the mental limit, they quit investing. In a
study with hypothetical incentives, Zeelenberg and Van Dijk (1997) find that behavioral sunk
costs increase risk averse instead of risk seeking behavior in a subsequent monetary gamble. The
authors argue that this is more likely to occur when a risk avoiding choice allows reaching an
aspiration level. In our setup, an aspiration level equal to earning a positive payoff in the task
could explain that participants are more willing to gamble when the “losing” outcome of the
additional investment is considered satisfactory (with low Cinitial), but not when the “losing”
outcome fails to satisfy the aspiration level (with high Cinitial). We note however, that one could
also argue in favor of the opposite. If costs have been high, people could be far off their aspiration
levels and therefore willing to gamble in order to reach it. Exploring which exact channel is at
work would be an interesting question for future research.
Our results clearly show that findings using hypothetical scenarios do not necessarily trans-
late into behavior with real monetary consequences. Our findings in the hypothetical scenarios
22
replicate the ones in the seminal work by Arkes and Blumer (1985). However, even when con-
sidering only the participants who exhibit a strong hypothetical sunk cost bias, we observe a
reverse sunk cost bias in the incentivized setting. We consider this as strong evidence that stated
preferences elicited with questionnaires and revealed preferences using incentivized methods differ
substantially, at least in the sunk cost domain.
In addition to the incentives themselves, a potential explanation for this discrepancy could
be that the descriptions of the decision environments in the vignette studies leave room for
interpretation. The participants might therefore interpret the incentives differently than the
researchers intend and in a way that actually makes reacting to sunk cost rational. Mcafee
et al. (2010) characterize a broad range of environments in which this may be the case. For
example, reputational concerns could play a role. Some decision makers might believe that
stopping investing and admitting that the project failed would ruin their reputation as effective
decision makers (Davis et al., 1997), especially when they are responsible for the initial investment.
Our results for the hypothetical scenarios are consistent with this explanation as participants are
more sunk cost prone in the responsibility condition. Other misconceptions of the incentives
described in the hypothetical scenarios are also plausible. In contrast to this, the incentives in
our investment task are clear at every stage. Participants also make their investment decisions
privately and reputational concerns are thus absent.
Studies with hypothetical decision situations have found that responsibility leads to a greater
sunk cost bias (Sleesman et al., 2012; Staw, 1976). In our incentivized setting, we do not find that
responsibility for the initial investment affects the propensity to make the additional investment.
In that respect, a potential caveat regarding our within-subject design could be that subjects
would like to appear consistent. However, this should then also hold for the hypothetical decision
situations where we replicate, also within-subject, the responsibility effect found in previous
hypothetical studies.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the sunk cost bias and our findings underline the
need for more controlled laboratory experiments with real consequences. For instance, one avenue
of future research could be to test whether a more vivid and engaging initial investment (e.g.,
real effort task) is a crucial component for the sunk cost bias to emerge. In addition, one could
also test the role of different proximity to project completion (Conlon and Garland, 1993) and
different accountability in terms of reputational loss (Fox and Staw, 1979). In any case, the search
for the sunk cost bias in the laboratory needs to go on.
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Appendix
A Models with coefficients of control variables reported
In this section we present the full regression models of the main text with coefficients of control
variables reported. The variable Initial Cost > 0 is coded as a dummy variable that takes on
value 1 when Cinitial > 0 (that is, when sunk costs are present) and the variable Initial Cost is
coded as a continuous variable taking on the values of Cinitial. Responsibility is a dummy variable
which takes on value 1 when the participant is responsible for making the initial investment. The
variable Loss aversion encodes the switching point in the loss aversion task. Waste aversion
is coded as a continuous variable that reflects the individual tendency of disliking waste or to
appear wasteful. Hypothetical sunk cost score is a continuous variable that captures the extent to
which a participant exhibits a sunk cost bias at various degrees (0–4) in hypothetical scenarios.
The regression models display also the coefficient estimates for probability of success, gender (1
if male), whether the field of study is economics (1 if yes), and the repetitions of trials in the task
(period).
Table A.1 reports the results of the logit panel regressions reported in Table 1 (Model (1) and
(2)) and Table 2 (Model (3) and (4)).
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Table A.1. The effect of initial investment (Model 1 and 2) and responsibility (Model 3 and 4)
on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial Cost > 0 -1.380∗∗∗ -1.377∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.229)
Initial Cost -0.142∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024)
Responsibility 0.034 0.029
(0.106) (0.104)
Initial Cost > 0 × Responsibility -0.007
(0.160)
Initial Cost × Responsibility 0.001
(0.015)
Loss aversion -0.182∗ -0.185∗ -0.181∗ -0.185∗
(0.080) (0.082) (0.080) (0.082)
Waste aversion 0.044+ 0.046+ 0.044+ 0.045+
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Period -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male 0.178 0.173 0.178 0.173
(0.265) (0.272) (0.265) (0.272)
Economics 0.193 0.203 0.193 0.203
(0.266) (0.275) (0.266) (0.275)
Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.128 0.131 0.128 0.131
(0.109) (0.112) (0.109) (0.112)
Probability of success 13.063∗∗∗ 13.427∗∗∗ 13.063∗∗∗ 13.427∗∗∗
(0.906) (0.911) (0.906) (0.911)
Constant -6.288∗∗∗ -6.529∗∗∗ -6.303∗∗∗ -6.541∗∗∗
(0.879) (0.888) (0.878) (0.883)
N 3619 3619 3619 3619
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the participant level.
Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise. In model
(1) and (3), the initial costs are coded as a dummy variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk
costs are present, 0 otherwise. In model (2) and (4), the initial costs are coded as a continuous variable
Initial Cost. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.2 displays the coefficients of the variables of the logit panel regression reported in Table 3
in the main text that investigates the effect of the waste aversion.
Table A.2. The effect of waste aversion on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Waste aversion 0.040+ 0.081+
(0.024) (0.043)
Initial Cost > 0 0.700
(1.473)
Initial Cost > 0 × Waste aversion -0.070
(0.048)
Loss aversion -0.166∗ -0.187∗
(0.073) (0.081)
Period -0.017∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Male 0.167 0.174
(0.241) (0.265)
Economics 0.172 0.192
(0.243) (0.267)
Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.119 0.129
(0.100) (0.110)
Probability of success 11.962∗∗∗ 13.077∗∗∗
(0.904) (0.895)
Constant -6.316∗∗∗ -7.377∗∗∗
(0.821) (1.287)
N 3619 3619
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at participant level. Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in
the continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise. The initial costs are coded as a
dummy variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs are present,
0 otherwise. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.3 below displays the coefficients of the variables of the logit panel regression reported in
Table 4 in the main text reporting the role of being in the loss domain on additional investment.
Table A.3. The effect of being in the loss domain on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Loss domain -0.779∗∗∗ -1.514∗∗
(0.188) (0.475)
Loss aversion -0.315∗∗∗ -0.145
(0.095) (0.112)
Loss domain × Loss aversion -0.329+
(0.172)
Waste aversion 0.012 0.012
(0.028) (0.029)
Period -0.017∗∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Male 0.041 0.032
(0.303) (0.305)
Economics 0.459 0.470
(0.310) (0.313)
Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.044 0.042
(0.110) (0.110)
Probability of success 12.761∗∗∗ 12.901∗∗∗
(0.909) (0.915)
Constant -6.413∗∗∗ -6.098∗∗∗
(1.044) (1.046)
N 1612 1612
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the participant level. Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment
in the continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise. The initial costs are coded as a
dummy variable Loss Domain that takes value 1 when initial costs are e12 or
e14, 0 otherwise. Only cases where Cinitial > e0 are included. + p < 0.10, ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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B Robustness checks
In this section we present different robustness checks of the regression model investigating the
role of the initial investment and the role of responsibility (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2). The
main finding of a reverse sunk cost effect and the null effect of responsibility are robust and
present in all the different checks reported below, such as when considering only the participants
who always made the initial investment when responsible for it, when analyzing only those who
not always make the initial investment when responsible for it, or when using a linear probability
model instead of a logit model.
B.1 Only participants who always made the initial investment
Table B.1 includes only those participants who always made the initial investment when respon-
sible for it. Model (1) and (2) reports the effect of the initial investment on the likelihood to
make the additional investment (cf. Table 1 in the main text). Model (3) and (4) report the
effect of responsibility (cf. Table 2 in the main text).
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Table B.1. The effect of initial investment (Model 1 and 2) and responsibility (Model 3 and 4)
on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial Cost > 0 -1.305∗∗∗ -1.295∗∗∗
(0.307) (0.317)
Initial Cost -0.136∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033)
Responsibility 0.088 0.130
(0.137) (0.132)
Initial Cost > 0 × Responsibility -0.021
(0.197)
Initial Cost × Responsibility -0.011
(0.018)
Loss aversion -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025
(0.126) (0.130) (0.126) (0.130)
Waste aversion 0.071∗ 0.073∗ 0.071∗ 0.073∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Period -0.017∗ -0.018∗ -0.017∗ -0.017∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Male 0.385 0.395 0.385 0.395
(0.415) (0.428) (0.415) (0.428)
Economics 0.133 0.140 0.133 0.140
(0.443) (0.455) (0.443) (0.455)
Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.236 0.241 0.236 0.241
(0.167) (0.171) (0.167) (0.171)
Probability of success 13.565∗∗∗ 13.914∗∗∗ 13.567∗∗∗ 13.918∗∗∗
(1.458) (1.483) (1.458) (1.485)
Constant -7.095∗∗∗ -7.302∗∗∗ -7.142∗∗∗ -7.371∗∗∗
(1.181) (1.187) (1.181) (1.184)
N 2196 2196 2196 2196
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the participant level.
Includes only participants who always made the initial investment. Dependent variable = 1 if the additional
investment in the continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise. In model (1) and (3), the initial costs are coded
as a dummy variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise. In model
(2) and (4), the initial costs are coded as a continuous variable Initial Cost. This table includes only the
participants who always made the initial investment when responsible for it. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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B.2 Only participants who did not always make the initial investment
Table B.2 below includes only those participants who did not always made the initial investment
when responsible for it. Model (1) and (2) reports the effect of the initial investment on the
likelihood of making the additional investment (cf. Table 1 in the main text). Model (3) and (4)
reports the effect of responsibility of the initial investment (cf. Table 2 in the main text).
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Table B.2. The effect of initial investment (Model 1 and 2) and responsibility (Model 3 and 4)
on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial Cost > 0 -1.474∗∗∗ -1.460∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.328)
Initial Cost -0.148∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.035)
Responsibility -0.038 -0.112
(0.160) (0.158)
Initial Cost > 0 × Responsibility -0.033
(0.253)
Initial Cost × Responsibility 0.014
(0.025)
Waste aversion 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.017
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Period -0.020∗∗ -0.018∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.018∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Male 0.009 -0.013 0.011 -0.010
(0.320) (0.328) (0.320) (0.328)
Economics 0.083 0.091 0.082 0.090
(0.326) (0.340) (0.325) (0.340)
Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.069 0.072 0.069 0.072
(0.138) (0.142) (0.138) (0.142)
Loss aversion -0.272∗∗ -0.278∗∗ -0.273∗∗ -0.279∗∗
(0.092) (0.095) (0.093) (0.095)
Probability of success 12.443∗∗∗ 12.827∗∗∗ 12.445∗∗∗ 12.821∗∗∗
(0.960) (0.913) (0.961) (0.911)
Constant -5.166∗∗∗ -5.451∗∗∗ -5.158∗∗∗ -5.406∗∗∗
(1.093) (1.133) (1.081) (1.116)
N 1423 1423 1423 1423
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the participant level.
Includes only participants who did not always make the initial investment. Dependent variable = 1 if the
additional investment in the continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise. In model (1) and (3), the initial costs
are coded as a dummy variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise.
In model (2) and (4), the initial costs are coded as a continuous variable Initial Cost. This table includes
only the participants who did not always make the initial investment when responsible for it. + p < 0.10, ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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B.3 Linear probability models instead of logit regression models
Table B.3 presents regression results using a linear probability model instead of a logit model.
Model (1) and (2) reports the effect of the initial investment on the likelihood of making the
additional investment (cf. Table 1 in the main text). Model (3) and (4) reports the effect of
responsibility of the initial investment (cf. Table 2 in the main text).
35
Table B.3. The effect of initial investment (Model 1 and 2) and responsibility (Model 3 and 4)
on additional investment.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial Cost > 0 -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.030)
Initial Cost -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Responsibility 0.004 0.003
(0.012) (0.012)
Initial Cost > 0 × Responsibility 0.000
(0.021)
Initial Cost × Responsibility 0.000
(0.002)
Waste aversion 0.006+ 0.006+ 0.006+ 0.006+
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Period -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.025
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Economics 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Loss aversion -0.022∗ -0.022∗ -0.022∗ -0.022∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Probability of success 1.828∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗∗ 1.828∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131)
Constant -0.359∗∗ -0.365∗∗ -0.361∗∗ -0.366∗∗
(0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123)
N 3619 3619 3619 3619
Note: Linear probability regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the participant
level. Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation stage is made, 0 otherwise.
In model (1) and (3), the initial costs are coded as a dummy variable Initial Cost > 0 that takes value of
1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise. In model (2) and (4), the initial costs are coded as a continuous
variable Initial Cost. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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C Initial cost as dummy variables
Table C.1 shows the results of a logit panel regression testing for the effect of each initial cost
on the additional investment. Each initial cost is coded as a dummy variable. The results of the
comparison between levels is summarized below.
• All the estimated coefficients for each initial cost level are negative and significantly different
from Initial cost = 0 (p < 0.001).
• Initial cost = 4 is significantly different from all the other Initial cost level (p < 0.001).
• Initial cost = 8 is not significantly different from Initial cost = 12 (p = 0.122) and from
Initial cost = 14 (p = 0.018).
• Initial cost = 12 is not significantly different from Initial cost = 14 (p = 0.405).
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Table C.1. The effect of each initial investment coded as dummy on additional investment.
Model: (1)
Dependent variable: Additional investment
Initial cost = 4 -0.517∗∗
(0.163)
Initial cost = 8 -1.448∗∗∗
(0.246)
Initial cost = 12 -1.724∗∗∗
(0.302)
Initial cost = 14 -1.862∗∗∗
(0.307)
Responsibility 0.033
(0.070)
Waste aversion 0.045+
(0.027)
Period -0.017∗∗
(0.005)
Male 0.174
(0.273)
Economics 0.203
(0.276)
Hypothetical sunk cost score 0.132
(0.112)
Loss aversion -0.186∗
(0.082)
Probability of success 13.454∗∗∗
(0.915)
Constant -6.542∗∗∗
(0.889)
N 3619
Note: Logit panel regression. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses clustered at the participant level. Dependent variable = 1 if
the additional investment in the continuation stage is made, 0 oth-
erwise. The initial costs are coded as a dummy variables for each
level of initial cost. The baseline category is Initial Cost = 0. +
p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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D Loss aversion
Table D.1 shows the lottery choice task used to elicit loss aversion. Lotteries 1 to 5 all have
a non-negative expected value. In our experiment, most participants rejected gambles with a
positive expected value (see Table D.2). Specifically, around 67% of the participants rejected at
least lottery 4, some even lottery 1 to 3. The median participant’s switching lottery is 2, that
is, acceptance of lotteries 1 and 2 and rejection of lotteries 3 to 6, which implies a loss-aversion
coefficient λ = 2. This coefficient is slightly higher than the one reported in Gächter et al. (2007)
who used the same task. Two participants have multiple switching points.
Table D.1. Lottery choice task
Lottery Accept Reject
#1. If the coin turns up head, then you lose e2; if the coin turns up tails, you win e6. O O
#2. If the coin turns up head, then you lose e3; if the coin turns up tails, you win e6. O O
#3. If the coin turns up head, then you lose e4; if the coin turns up tails, you win e6. O O
#4. If the coin turns up head, then you lose e5; if the coin turns up tails, you win e6. O O
#5. If the coin turns up head, then you lose e6; if the coin turns up tails, you win e6. O O
#6. If the coin turns up head, then you lose e7; if the coin turns up tails, you win e6. O O
Note: The winning prize is e6 for each lottery and the potential loss varies from e2 to e7.
Table D.2. Loss aversion
Acceptance and rejection behavior Percent Implied
acceptable
loss
Implied λ if
v(x) = x
7) Reject all lotteries 4.72 < e 2 > 3
6) Accept lottery #1, reject lotteries #2 to #6 20.75 e 2 3
5) Accept lottery #1 and #2, reject lotteries #3 to #6 41.51 e 3 2
4) Accept lottery #1 and #3, reject lotteries #4 to #6 19.81 e 4 1.5
3) Accept lottery #1 and #4, reject lotteries #5 to #6 8.49 e 5 1.2
2) Accept lottery #1 and #5, reject lotteries #6 1.89 e 6 1
1) Accept all lotteries 2.83 > e 7 ≤ 0.87
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E Additional investment by responsibility and probability
Figure E.1 shows the percentage of additional investment by responsibility and success probability
of the project, for each initial cost. The figure shows that participants invest more often when the
probability of success of a project is high (60%) than when it is low (40%) and that participants
make the additional investment less often in Initial cost projects (i.e., Initial Cost > 0 Euros) vs.
No initial cost projects (i.e., Initial Cost = 0 Euros). There is no difference between Responsibility
and No Responsibility projects.
Figure E.1. Additional investment by responsibility and probability of success.
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F Hypothetical sunk cost score
Below are the hypothetical scenarios used in the sunk cost questionnaire. We adapted vignettes
1, 3A, 8 and 9 used in Arkes and Blumer (1985). Textual changes to the original versions are
emphasized in italic. The original text is shown between brackets.
1. Responsibility. Imagine that you have spent e400 [$100] on a ticket for a weekend ski trip
to France [Michigan]. Several weeks later you buy a e200 [$50] ticket for a weekend ski trip to
Italy [Wisconsin]. You think you will enjoy the Italy [Wisconsin] ski trip more than the France
[Michigan] ski trip. As you are putting your just-purchased Italy [Wisconsin] ski trip ticket in
your wallet, you notice that the France [Michigan] ski trip and the Italy [Wisconsin] ski trip are
for the same weekend! It’s too late to sell either ticket, and you cannot return either one. You
must use one ticket and not the other. Which ski trip will you go on?
Sunk cost answers: France (45/108 participants, 41.67%; in Arkes and Blumer (1985): 64%)
2. Responsibility. As the president of an airline company, you have invested 10 million Euros
[dollars] of the company’s money into a research project. The purpose was to build a plane that
would not be detected by conventional radar, in other words, a radar-blank plane. When the
project is 90% completed, another firm begins marketing a plane that cannot be detected by
radar. Also, it is apparent that their plane is much faster and far more economical than the plane
your company is building. The question is: should you invest the last 10% of the research funds
to finish your radar-blank plane?
Sunk cost answer: Yes (74/108 participants, 68.52%; in Arkes and Blumer (1985): 85%)
3. No Responsibility. The Acme Airline Company has invested 10 million Euros [dollars] of the
company’s money into a research project. The purpose was to build a plane that would not be
detected by conventional radar, in other words, a radar-blank plane. When the project is 90%
completed, another firm begins marketing a plane that cannot be detected by radar. Also, it is
apparent that their plane is much faster and more economical than the plane Acme is building.
The question is should Acme Airlines invest the last million Euros of its research funds to finish
the radar-blank plane?
Sunk cost answer: Yes (74/108 participants, 68.52%; in Arkes and Blumer (1985): 63%)
4. No Responsibility. As you are listening to the radio one morning, the disk jockey calls you.
He informs you that you have won a free ski trip to either France [Michigan] or Italy [Wisconsin]
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the last weekend of skiing season (which happens to be next weekend). You think you will prefer
the trip to Italy [Wisconsin] rather than the trip to France [Michigan]. You call a travel agent
and find out that the value of the Italy [Michigan] ski trip is e200 [$100], and the value of the
France [Wisconsin] ski trip is e400 [$50]. You must decide which trip to take. Which trip will
you go on?
Sunk cost answer: France (30/108 participants, 27.78%; in Arkes and Blumer (1985): 51%)
In our study, most people answer at least one time according to the sunk cost bias predictions.
Figure F.1 shows the percentage of people for the number of answers consistent with sunk cost bias
in the hypothetical scenarios. A score of 0 means that participants never answered in line with
the sunk cost bias. A score of 4 means that a participant always exhibited a the sunk cost bias.
Figure F.2 shows the percentage of people for the number of answers consistent with the sunk
cost bias in the hypothetical scenarios, by responsibility. A score of 2 means that a participant
always exhibited the sunk cost bias in each category (Responsibility and No Responsibility).
Figure F.1. Hypothetical scenario sunk cost
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Figure F.2. Hypothetical scenario sunk cost by responsibility
Table F.1 reports logit regression results of the effect of the initial investment when considering
only the participants who display a strong tendency to exhibit the sunk cost bias in the hypo-
thetical scenarios (that is, those participants who answered 3 or 4 out of 4 answers consistent
with the sunk cost bias).
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Table F.1. The effect of initial investment on additional investment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Cost > 0 -1.961∗∗∗ -2.232∗∗∗
(-5.85) (-6.16)
Initial Cost -0.215∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗
(-5.47) (-5.75)
Responsibility -0.229 -0.121
(-1.15) (-0.68)
Initial Cost > 0 × Responsibility 0.563∗
(1.98)
Initial Cost × Responsibility 0.0410
(1.50)
Waste aversion -0.0152 -0.0203 -0.0159 -0.0206
(-0.32) (-0.39) (-0.33) (-0.39)
Period -0.0167∗ -0.0180∗ -0.0164∗ -0.0181∗
(-2.02) (-1.99) (-1.96) (-2.01)
Male 0.144 0.130 0.146 0.134
(0.38) (0.31) (0.38) (0.32)
Economics 0.734+ 0.819+ 0.741+ 0.825+
(1.68) (1.73) (1.69) (1.73)
Hypothetical sunk cost score -0.176 -0.190 -0.175 -0.188
(-0.40) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.39)
Probability of success 12.64∗∗∗ 13.66∗∗∗ 12.70∗∗∗ 13.71∗∗∗
(10.19) (11.22) (10.27) (11.22)
Loss aversion -0.377∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗
(-3.35) (-3.31) (-3.36) (-3.32)
Constant -3.713+ -3.964 -3.617 -3.925
(-1.65) (-1.63) (-1.60) (-1.61)
N 1287 1287 1287 1287
Note: Logit panel regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the par-
ticipant level. Dependent variable = 1 if the additional investment in the continuation stage
is made, 0 otherwise. In model (1), the initial costs are coded as a dummy variable Initial
Cost > 0 that takes value of 1 if sunk costs are present, 0 otherwise. In model (2), the initial
costs are coded as a continuous variable Initial Cost. This table includes only the partici-
pants who answered more than 2 questions out of 4 according to sunk cost predictions in the
hypothetical task. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
44
G Instructions used in the experiment
G.1 Instructions Investment task
Welcome to this decision-making experiment. You will make choices in several decision situa-
tions. All your decisions are private and you do not interact with anyone. Your earnings only
depend on your own decisions and chance events. This will be explained in detail later in these
instructions. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait
for an experimenter to come to you to answer your question in private. It is not allowed to talk,
exclaim, or try to communicate with other participants during the experiment. Participants in-
tentionally violating the rules will be asked to leave the experiment and will forfeit any earnings.
This experiment consists of several parts. You will receive information on each part right before
the respective part will begin. The next pages contain the instructions for the first part of the
experiment. Please read the instructions carefully. You will be asked to answer comprehension
questions before participating in this part of the experiment.
Your Endowment
In the first part of the experiment, you receive an initial endowment of e10. Your final earnings
in this part of the experiment can be more or less than the e10 initial endowment, depending on
your decisions and chance events.
Decision situations
This part consists of 36 projects. Each project, consists of up to two decision situations in which
you have to decide whether you want to invest into the project or not. We call the decisions
situations investment stages. For each project, there are up to two investment stages:
• An initial investment stage, where an initial investment is required for the project to start.
– Sometimes, you can decide to make the initial investment or not.
– Sometimes, the computer decides on your behalf to make the initial investment.
There are costs associated with an initial investment. These costs vary across projects and
can take any of these values: e0, e4, e8, e12 and e14.
• An additional investment stage. If you or the computer decides to make the initial invest-
ment, an additional investment is required to complete the project.
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– The additional investment costs are always e4.
– You can decide to make an additional investment or not.
Initial investment stage
• An initial investment is required to start the project.
• If the initial investment is made, there will be investment costs associated with it. You will
know the actual investment costs only after the initial investment is made. On average, you
can expect the initial investment costs to be:
– e0 five out of nine times;
– e4 one out of nine times;
– e8 one out of nine times;
– e12 one out of nine times;
– e14 one out of nine times.
Figure G.1. Probability of occurrence of initial investment costs, if an initial investment is
made
• Sometimes, you can decide to make the initial investment or not. In this case you will see
a screen like the one shown in Figure G.2.
• After you have made the initial investment, you will be informed about the actual initial
investment costs for the current project. This ends the initial investment stage.
• G.3 shows an example where you decided to make the initial investment and you are in-
formed that the initial investment costs are e14.
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Figure G.2. Example of a decision situation in which you can decide to make the initial
investment
Figure G.3. Example of a decision situation in which the initial investment you made is e14
• Sometimes, the computer makes the initial investment on your behalf. In this case you will
see a screen like the one shown in Figure G.4.
Figure G.5 shows an example where the computer made the initial investment and the costs are
e14.
If you or the computer do not make the initial investment, you will move to the next project.
Additional investment stage
• If the initial investment is made (by you or by the computer), you proceed to the additional
investment stage.
• To complete the project, it is necessary to make an additional investment.
• The additional investment costs are always e4.
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Figure G.4. Example of a decision situation in which the computer makes the initial investment
on your behalf
Figure G.5. Example of a decision situation in which the initial investment the computer made
is e14
• If you make the additional investment, there is a probability that the project is successful.
This probability will be either 40% or 60%.
• For half of the projects, the probability of success is 40% and for the other half it is 60%.
The example in Figure G.6 shows a project with a probability of success of 40%.
• You earn different amounts depending on whether the project is successful or unsuccessful.
• If the project is successful, you earn e16
• If the project is unsuccessful, you earn e8.
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Figure G.6. Example of additional investment. You will see the additional investment stage,
only if the initial investment is made (by you or by the computer). You are reminded about
the amount invested in the initial investment stage and you are presented with the additional
investment costs and the probability of success of the project.
• You can also decide not to make the additional investment. In this case the project is
always unsuccessful.
Your earnings after the additional investment stage:
If the additional investment is not made, the project is always unsuccessful. Your final payment
in this case is:
• Endowment (e10) – Initial investment + e8
If the additional investment is made, your final payment is:
• If the project is unsuccessful:
Endowment (e10) – Initial investment – Additional investment (e4) + e8
• If the project is successful:
Endowment (e10) – Initial investment– Additional investment (e4) + e16
Final payment calculation
Final payment = e10 Endowment - Initial investment – e4 Additional investment + Project
Payoff
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• If the initial investment is not made, your final payment is: Endowment (e10).
• If the initial investment is made, the initial investment costs (i.e., e0, e4, e8, e12 or e14)
are deducted, and you proceed to the additional investment stage.
• If the additional investment is not made, the project is automatically unsuccessful and your
final payment is:
Endowment (e10) – Initial investment + Unsuccessful Project payoff (e8).
• If the additional investment is made, you invest an additional e4 and the project can be
successful according to the probability of success of 40% or 60%.
– If the project is successful, your final payment is:
Endowment (e10) – Initial investment – Additional investment (e4) + Successful
Project payoff (e16)
– If the project is unsuccessful, your final payment is:
Endowment (e10) – Initial investment – Additional investment (e4) + Unsuccessful
Project payoff (e8)
Your Decisions
You will face 36 decision situations. We ask you to make your investment decisions within
the time limit you will see on the top right part of the screen.
Information: Until the end of the experiment you will not receive any feedback regarding
the success of the projects.
50
Payment
At the end of the experiment, one of the 36 decision situations will be randomly selected for
payout. Each decision situation is equally likely and your decisions in one decision situation
do not affect any other decision situation. Thus, each decision situation could be the one
relevant for your payment. Therefore, carefully consider your decisions in each decision
situation. The amount you earn will be transferred to your bank account at the end of the
experimental session. All bank transfers will be made on the same day of the experiment
by someone who is not directly involved in this study and who does not have access to the
data related to your decisions. Your anonymity is thus guaranteed.
Your Identity
For the entire duration of the experiment, your anonymity and the anonymity of all other
participants is guaranteed. You will never be asked to reveal your choices to other par-
ticipants during or after the experiment. Your decisions are thus private. Your name and
personal information are recorded only at the end of the experiment to pay you. To keep
your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant. All the
interactions are anonymous and none of the participants can communicate or influence the
choices of the others.
This is the end of the instructions for Part 1. You can now answer the comprehension
questions. If you have any questions please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter.
G.2 Instructions loss aversion task
Welcome to this part of the experiment. You see below a list of lotteries. Each lottery consists
of a coin toss with 50% probability of success. You are asked to Accept or Reject each of these
lotteries. If you Accept the lottery, you can either win or lose money. This amount will be added
(if the lottery is successful) or subtracted (if the lottery fails) from the e7 you earned by answering
the questionnaire in the previous part of the experiment. If you Reject the lottery, you will neither
win nor lose money and you receive the e7 you earned by completing the questionnaire. At the
end of the experiment, one of the lotteries will be randomly selected for payout and you will be
paid according to your decision. Any earnings from this part of the experiment will be added
to your previous earnings, and will be transferred to your bank account after the end of this
experimental session.
Participants then saw the lotteries as in Table D.1.
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